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The Russian and Norwegian Arctic are gaining notoriety as an alternative
maritime route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and as sources of
natural resources. The renewed interest in the Northeast Passage or the
Northern Sea Route is fueled by a recession of Arctic sea ice coupled with the
discovery of new natural resources at a time when emerging and global markets
are in growing demand for them. Driven by the expectation of potential future
economic importance of the region, political interest and governance has been
rapidly developing, mostly within the Arctic Council. However, this paper
argues that optimism regarding the potential of Arctic routes as an alternative to
the Suez Canal is overstated. The route involves many challenges: jurisdictional
disputes create political uncertainties; shallow waters limit ship size; lack of
modern deepwater ports and search and rescue (SAR) capabilities requires ships
to have higher standards of autonomy and safety; harsh weather conditions and
free-floating ice make navigation more difficult and schedules more variable;
and more expensive ship construction and operation costs lessen the economic
viability of the route. Technological advances and infrastructure investments
may ameliorate navigational challenges, enabling increased shipping of natural
resources from the Arctic to global markets.
Introduction
As sea ice recedes in the Arctic, expectations for a commercially feasible Arctic
shipping route are rising. Increased access to natural resources and longer
navigation seasons are making the Arctic more appealing as a source of new
energy and mineral supplies and as an avenue for maritime transport. The
economic lure is also appealing to states, leading them to work toward developing
a governance framework in anticipation of an economic boom.
Analysis of Arctic shipping has focused predominantly on two routes: the
Northeast Passage (NEP) encompassing the route along the Norwegian and
Russian Arctic coasts, and the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian
Archipelago and North of Alaska (Figure 1). While the NEP is at times called the
Northern Sea Route (NSR), the NSR is formally defined in Russian law as
extending from the Novaya Zhelaniya straits (at the Novaya Zemlya archipelago,
connecting the Barents Sea to the West and the Kara Sea to the East), to Cape
Dezhnev by the Bering Strait (Solski 2013). The main difference between the NSR
and the NEP is that the latter comprises the Barents Sea (Østreng et al. 2013) and
provides access to the port of Murmansk, the largest Russian Arctic port. Given
that the NSR constitutes the majority of the NEP, many sources use the terms NSR
and NEP interchangeably. Thick multiyear ice, complex straits, and pingos
(underwater ice formations protruding from the seabed) make navigation especially
arduous in the NWP (Østreng et al. 2013, p. 25, Yoshikawa et al. 2006). While
mainly limited to summer, navigation along the NEP is relatively easier owing to
lower overall ice extent and open water in the Barents Sea (Østreng et al. 2013).
Unlike similar latitudes in Alaska or in Canada, this area remains ice-free due to
currents of warm water from the Gulf Stream, feeding into the North Atlantic
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Current, flowing toward the Northeast Atlantic (Rasmussen and Turner 2003,
p. 68). A third option, the Transpolar Route traversing the North Pole, encounters
thick and persistent ice. Even aggressive climate model scenarios project extensive
sea ice in winter in the central Arctic for decades to come (Østreng et al. 2013).
Despite its economic potential, significant environmental and infrastructural
challenges constrain resource and transport activities in the Arctic. This paper
critiques the claim that melting sea ice alone will attract large-scale shipping
between Atlantic and Pacific and evaluates the variables for potential future
success. We first determine that the NEP is the most practicable route in the Arctic,
both as a corridor for the transport of natural resources and as a shorter avenue for
transit shipping. We then examine how economic potential is driving international
efforts to develop stronger governance in the region and assess the potential
impacts on shipping from Russia’s controversial interpretation of maritime law. We
then evaluate the technical feasibility of Arctic shipping by first surveying the
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Figure 1. The NSR, The NEP, and Trans-Polar Route (adapted from Stephenson et al.
2013b).
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evolution of Arctic ice in recent decades, followed by an evaluation of shipping
technology, needs for broadband communications, and the promising emerging
field of ice forecasting. Then we examine the necessity for support infrastructure
such as seaports and search and rescue (SAR) capabilities, which are currently
lacking in Russia, but progressively developing. Finally, we evaluate the potential
of the Arctic as a shipping space in comparison to the Suez Canal Route. We
conclude by distinguishing between the large-scale climate impacts and medium-
term policy-driven factors like infrastructure and technology in developing an
economically feasible Arctic route.
The economic lure
The substantial reduction of ice thickness, age, and extent since the early 2000s has
spurred interest in future economic development. Of the three Arctic shipping
routes, the NEP, along the Eurasian northern coast, has the highest potential to
enable economic activity in the Arctic. This promise is two-pronged: transit
shipping, for transporting cargo between non-Arctic ports, and destinational
shipping, for activities with an origin or destination in the Arctic. These include
fishing, tourist cruises, scientific expeditions, and resource extraction. Of these,
resource extraction is the sector with the most immediate potential for expansion of
shipping activities as a means of transporting resources out of the region, either
westward to Europe or eastward to Asia.
For shipping between Northeast Asia and Europe (for example, from Shanghai
to Rotterdam) the oldest, pre-Suez route spans about 14,000 nautical miles around
the Cape of Good Hope. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the trip
by 23%, and the NEP has the potential to shrink the distance by a further 24%,
when little or no sea ice is present. The NEP is most enticing for trade with
Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, and China), gradually losing appeal as one moves
south toward Ho Chi Minh City where the NEP and Suez routes are virtually
equidistant (see Table 1).
Therefore, the NEP is only one of several avenues for Eurasian trade, with the
main competitor being the Suez Canal Route. Shipping activity along the NEP has
Table 1. Sailing distances between Asia and Europe.
To Rotterdam, via (in nautical miles)
Difference between Suez and
NEP (%)From
Cape of
Good Hope
Suez
Canal NEP
Yokohama 14,448 11,133 7010 37
Busan 14,084 10,744 7667 29
Shanghai 13,796 10,557 8046 24
Hong Kong 13,014 9701 8594 11
Ho Chi
Minh City
12,258 8887 9428 –6
Note: Sailing distances between major East Asian ports and Rotterdam are calculated by
taking the distance between Yokohama and Hamburg via the NEP and Suez Canal routes (as
provided by Østreng et al 2013, p. 49) and approximating the additional distances originating
before Yokohama and beyond Hamburg, using an online voyage calculator (http://sea-
distances.com/). Distances assume no route diversions owing to ice conditions.
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occurred for centuries. Before the twentieth century it was sporadic, with many
failures, and mostly driven by scientific and exploration expeditions. In the 1900s,
during Soviet Union times, the NSR greatly developed as a heavily subsidized and
entirely domestic route, with traffic peaking in 1987 with 6.58 million tons of cargo
carried by 331 ships over 1306 voyages. Arctic traffic collapsed to 1.5–2 M tons
once the subsidies vanished with the demise of the USSR and has yet to return to
those levels (Ragner 2008, Stephenson et al. 2013a). The question is whether the
recent rapid loss of sea ice in combination with new governance and new technical
developments will substantially increase the potential for Arctic shipping. The
increase of actual shipping has so far been minimal in a broader global context.
While voyages from or through the NEP grew from almost 0 in 2008 to 44 in 2013
(NSR Information Office 2014), 17,225 ships passed through the Suez Canal in
2012 (Suez Canal Authority 2013). The NSR reported a total of 71 voyages in 2013,
of which 27 had both their origin and destination within the NEP; 25 of them were
destinational, having either their origin or their destination within the NEP; and 19
of them were full trans-Arctic voyages traversing completely the Arctic, connecting
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.1
Numerous scholars have noted the challenges of using the NEP for container
shipping. Container ships operate under a just-in-time system, which relies on
precise schedules for loading, shipping, and unloading to maximize the efficiency of
logistics and push costs down (Humpert and Raspotnik 2012b, Lasserre and
Pelletier 2011, Liu and Kronbak 2010, Stephenson et al. 2013a, Verny and
Grigentin 2009). Therefore, predictability is highly sought-after, and the Suez
Canal Route offers the most stable option, bar piracy in the Indian Ocean. In
contrast, the NEP may be highly unpredictable owing to seasonal variability in ice
extent and local ice drift (Smith 2009). Unlike container ships, bulk cargo ships do
not require such precise schedules and can better cope with variability of the NEP.
In addition, it must also be noted that since bulk cargo shipping is less sensitive to
timing, it also has the potential to adopt super-slow sailing. This means using the
shorter distance of the NEP to sail at slower speeds and still arrive within the same
time frame as if using the Suez route but achieving greater fuel efficiency, lowering
fuel costs and emissions (Humpert and Raspotnik 2012b). These, coupled with the
large energy and mineral potential of the Eurasian Arctic and the availability of
Russian icebreaker support, have made destinational resource shipping the most
economically viable sea trade activity in the NEP. These resources consist of oil,
gas, and minerals such as phosphates, nickel, and copper.
Russia’s undiscovered petroleum is estimated between 66 billion tons of oil
equivalent (BTOE) according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) (Bird
et al. 2008, Gautier et al. 2009) and 142 BTOE according to the Russian Academy
of Science (Efimov et al. 2014, Kontorovich 2009)2. To put this in perspective, in
2011, the world consumed 13 BTOE of energy, 31% from oil and 21% from natural
gas (International Energy Agency 2013). Russia’s vast energy resources account for
52% of the Arctic totals and Norway’s for 12% (Bird et al. 2008). Norway, which
has been extracting petroleum in the North Sea for 40 years, now expects new
discoveries in the Barents Sea (NPD 2011). Russia is currently exporting 88% of
crude oil via pipelines, with a large majority of the natural gas also transported in
that manner. Seventy-six percent of natural gas and 79% of oil are exported to
Europe, with the second largest customer for oil being China and for natural gas
being Japan. Russia continues to expand both its pipeline networks and its
302 A. Buixade´ Farre´ et al.
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seaborne capacity, with absolute maritime transportation of petroleum growing but
remaining a small portion of the overall exports (EIA 2013).
The Arctic also holds large quantities of minerals, including phosphate, bauxite,
iron ore, copper, and nickel. These are of pervasive use in industrialized economies.
Russia produces an average of 11 M tons of phosphates, 8% of the global output
(Bambulyak et al. 2012). Phosphates are used as fertilizers in agriculture, with other
uses including water treatment, flame-retardant materials, and corrosion protec-
tion. In 2010, Russia also extracted and processed bauxite into 3.85 M tons of
aluminum, constituting 9.3% of the global production and making it the second-
largest producer in the world after China. It also mined 100 M tons of iron ore,
6.25% of the global production (Bambulyak et al. 2012).
Nickel is an important metal used in the production of steel and other industrial,
commercial, and consumer goods. The largest Russian mining company Norilsk
Nickel MMC leads the world’s production of nickel and palladium as a by-product.
The company has its own fleet of vessels to ship out the minerals and also owns
port terminals. Worldwide production of nickel was of 1.5 M tons in 2011, out of
which 297,000 tons was mined by the Russian giant, holding 5.8 M more in proven
reserves (2010 figures). Palladium is mostly used in engines as a catalyst converting
90% of highly harmful exhaust gasses into less harmful ones. The company is also a
major producer of copper (mining 389,000 tons out of 8.7 M tons worldwide),
platinum, rhodium, and cobalt (Bambulyak et al. 2012). In anticipation of a growth
in demand for government icebreaker services, Norilsk Nickel started in 2006 to
order the construction of its own fleet of five icebreaking cargo vessels, now in
operation. These vessels are capable of breaking through 1.5 m (5 ft) of ice at a rate
of 1–2 knots, without the support of an icebreaker, while transporting 14,500 tons
of cargo (Litovkin 2012, Ragner 2008).
As an energy source, the Eurasian Arctic may have the greatest short-term
potential. The continued development of the large economies like those of China
and India will require massive supplies of raw materials and energy (Mouawad and
Werdigier 2007), both of which Russia and Norway can offer. For example,
China’s energy demand is projected to double by 2040 (EIA 2013). Most electricity
in the country is generated from plants burning coal, a plentiful domestic resource.
However, air pollution in the cities from coal emissions has thrust people to
unusually high levels of popular discontent and riots (Duggan 2013, EIA 2014,
Watts 2009). In response, the Chinese Government is increasingly turning to gas to
reduce city air pollution, and it can choose from three sources: domestic shale gas,
conversion of coal to synthetic natural gas, or imported natural gas. While China is
developing all the three options, the first two encounter severe drawbacks including
the use of large amounts of water, which is scarce in China (EIA 2014, Guilford
2014, Larson 2013, Perkowski 2013).
Furthermore, China ails from an overdependency on oil imports coming by
tanker from Africa and the Middle East (EIA 2014). These shipments must transit
through the Malacca Strait, stoking in China a sense of vulnerability and
overreliance on unstable sources and potentially unfriendly maritime neighbors as
the tankers traverse the South China Sea. China’s strategy to diversify its sources of
energy makes it a prime candidate to exploit the NEP (Humpert and Raspotnik
2012b). This interest is already materializing with the fact that China, a non-Arctic
country, has acquired its own icebreaking research vessel and is scheduled to build
another by 2016 (Associated Press 2012, NDTV 2014). Furthermore, China is
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seeking to obtain new oil and gas supplies from Russia (including from the Arctic),
to be transported overland by train and pipelines, and some by ship (Dyomkin
2013, Snow 2014). Furthermore, as Russia’s relations with Western countries
become more problematic, its interest in diversifying its markets also increases. To
fulfill its strategic diversification, Russia looks to China as a key partner. The two
countries have signed multiple petroleum development projects in the Arctic.
Recent examples are the agreement reached on May 2014, where Gazprom entered
into a 30-year $400 bn agreement with China to supply Siberian natural gas, most
of it to be transported via pipeline (Watt and Isachenkov 2014), and a July
agreement on a smaller Siberian Liquefied Natural Gas project (LNG, the method
used for the maritime transportation of gas) on the Yamal Peninsula (Reu-
ters 2014).
Despite the potential for bulk resource transport, significant physical and
logistical limitations persist. The coastal route of the NEP (which has been ice-
free in summer in recent years) has shallow bathymetry, with drafts of 13 and 6.7 m
in the Sannikov and Dmitry Laptev Straits, and with much of the Laptev Sea with
depths of <20 m (Figure 2). This bathymetry is limiting cargo size to approxi-
mately 50,000 deadweight tons (the total weight a ship can carry including cargo
and fuel), or 2500–4500 of twenty-foot equivalent unit containers (TEU). This
severely undermines the economies of scale achieved by much larger vessels (Ragner
2008, Stephenson et al. 2013a). These limitations carry a trade-off for shipping
companies: smaller vessels can sail through coastal waters, enjoying longer
navigation seasons at a cost of lower economies of scale; conversely, bigger ships
enable greater economies of scale but are forced to sail through deeper Arctic
waters farther from the coast with fewer days a year of ice-free conditions, unless
companies invest in ice-class vessels or pay for icebreaker escort (Stephenson et al.
2013a).
A new generation of ultra large container ships (ULCS), such as Maersk Triple
E-class that has a capacity exceeding 18,000 TEU, greatly surpass the current
standard of 6000–8000 TEU. While these ships offer much greater economies of
scale, their size (>15 m draft; >49 m beam) limits their potential in the Arctic. The
widths of these ULCS exceed that of icebreakers today (∼30 m; Humpert and
Raspotnik 2012b) and are unable to escort them.
To keep up with this growth in vessel’s carrying capacity, the Suez Canal
Authority has made numerous expansions to the canal over the years. The last
improvement was made in 2010, increasing the prior maximum ship draft of 62 ft
(19 m) to 66 ft (20 m), accommodating ships carrying up to 220,000 tons of cargo
(Reuters 2010). This allows passage of most container vessels (most have a draft of
15 m or less) but restricts some large dry bulk cargo and ULCS vessels. A new
phase for deepening the canal is under study to accommodate drafts of up to 72 ft
(22 m), making it navigable for ULCS, all dry bulk cargo vessels, and 80% of oil
tankers (Suez Canal Authority 2009).
Compared to the NEP, the Suez Canal Route offers larger vessel capacity,
greater predictability, and opportunities to stop at multiple ports along the way for
maintenance and support. Most importantly, it provides access to multiple markets
along highly populated coastal areas, as container ships rarely unload all cargo at a
single destination. Therefore, container shipping will continue to heavily concen-
trate along the Suez Canal Route, while bulk carriage of resources from the
Eurasian Arctic offers greater opportunities for shipping along the NEP.
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The maturing institutional framework
Commercial shipping and sustainable economic growth require a supportive, stable,
and predictable governance system. Unlike previous chapters in history when
expansion of human activity to new frontiers encountered political uncertainty and
lawlessness, the development of the Arctic is occurring alongside a maturing
international community and an increasingly robust legal and institutional
framework. As in other oceans around the world, human activity in the Arctic is
well regulated by a set of treaties and international organizations.
The main elements of governance along the NEP are the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic Council (AC), the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the domestic legislation of the
Russian Federation. In combination, albeit with significant gaps, they cover
territorial claims, economic exploitation, technical shipping requirements, environ-
mental protection, and SAR responsibilities. The gaps lie with disputed interpreta-
tions, inadequate regulations, and insufficient infrastructure. The foremost
international legal framework was provided in 1982 by UNCLOS, which codified
and expanded on the existing customary law that regulated human use of the sea,
by enshrining freedom of navigation, specifying rules to territorial claims, and
determining economic rights and broad environmental responsibilities.
Then, pursuant to stronger cooperation, the Arctic states created the AC in 1996
with the Ottawa Declaration. It was formed by the five states with large Arctic
Ocean coasts (U.S., Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark) and the three other
states within the Arctic Circle (Finland, Sweden, and Iceland). The AC also
provides Arctic native communities with a forum for addressing their interdepend-
ence in cross-boundary issues through the permanent member status of six groups
representing indigenous peoples: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Aleut Interna-
tional Association, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council,
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council (AC
2011, Koivurova et al. 2008). Finland described the AC as a forum ‘to strengthen
trust and mutual understanding between Arctic neighbors on the political platform
as well as among the people. Scientific cooperation has been promoted and is ever
growing as is the policy-shaping discussion on Arctic issues’ (MFA Finland 2013).
The organization has no regulatory authority of its own and serves instead as an
intergovernmental forum within which governments reach consensus-based
decisions.
The AC members are asserting their preeminence in the stewardship and
governance of the Arctic. They advocate for the multiple emerging challenges to
be addressed regionally, and with multiple tailored policies, in contrast to
developing a new UNCLOS-like all-encompassing single treaty, thus limiting
involvement by non-Arctic states (Rayfuse 2008, Young 2009). The five coastal
Arctic states affirmed this position in the 2008 Ilulissat declaration. Later in 2011,
the AC in clarifying its criteria for admission of observers, most notably included a
requirement of applicants to ‘recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights
and jurisdiction in the Arctic’ (Graczyk and Koivurova 2013, SAO 2011) and
‘recognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including,
notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation
for responsible management of this ocean’ (Graczyk and Koivurova 2013, SAO
2011). Reinforcing the validity of UNCLOS meant reinforcing the treaty as the
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existing overarching international law, which included reinforcing the application
of Article 234, extending the usual coastal state jurisdiction to broader ice-covered
areas.
The AC has expressed its intent to pursue a model of sustainable development
(AC Secretariat 2013) and has created six working groups (covering the issues of
contamination, wildlife and marine environment conservation, emergency preven-
tion and response, and sustainability) to inform the policy-making of the council
and its member states. It has also highlighted its intent to further increase
cooperation with the private sector on corporate social responsibility and to protect
the indigenous and local communities. With that spirit, the Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment’s (AMSA) recommendations included the creation of the Arctic
Indigenous Marine Use Survey (AIMUS) to better inform policy-makers on how
to protect the traditional livelihoods of local communities’ interests. This survey is
still underway.
While it started as a forum with low-level ministerial contacts, the AC has been
rising to become an increasingly active regional organization, reflecting the growing
importance of the Arctic as perceived by governments within and without the
Arctic Circle. Pursuant to its policy development objectives, the AC issued in 2009
the policy-oriented comprehensive AMSA. Its recommendations led to the first two
binding circumpolar treaties, of Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search
and Rescue in the Arctic in 2011 and on the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in 2013. Also for the 2011 biannual
meeting, the U.S. sent for first time its Secretary of State (Myers 2011), and again in
2013. In 2012, the conference of the parties established a permanent secretariat in
Norway.
In parallel to AC members becoming increasingly involved and at higher levels,
outside parties are also paying closer attention. Probably seeing the AC as the only
option for substantive political involvement in circumpolar cooperation, in 2013,
six non-Arctic states were granted observer status: China, India, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, and Italy (Myers 2013). These joined the ranks of the other existing
observers: the UK, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and France. Others
including the European Union (EU) have their application pending. The EU
observer status is awaiting an understanding with Canada over the EU’s ban of
sealskin imports (Boyd 2013). The inclusion of the most important Asian economies
as observers to the AC signals the importance the Arctic and its council may hold
for the wider world (Humpert and Raspotnik 2012a). Other examples of the AC’s
centrality are the European countries’ involvement in shipping governance (Liu
2013), and the French involvement in SAR agreements (Graczyk 2011).
The third element of governance is the IMO, which since 1959 has taken charge
of commercial shipping by setting worldwide uniform regulations and facilitating
cooperation toward safety, security, efficiency, and environmental responsibility.
The IMO has produced numerous international treaties subscribed by a majority of
states, including the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from
Vessels (MARPOL), International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling
Systems on Ships (Anti-fouling Convention), International Convention for the
Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (Ballast Water
Management), International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response
and Co-operation (OPRC).
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However, the international legal regime regulating shipping was established at a
time when the unique conditions of the Arctic were not a primary concern. Since
1991, the IMO has been deliberating the adoption of the mandatory International
Code of Safety for Ships operating in Polar Waters (in short, the Polar Code;
Brigham 2000, p. 248). So far only voluntary guidelines for vessels operating in
Arctic waters were adopted in 2002 (IMO 2002) and updated to include all Polar
Waters in 2009 (IMO 2009). More recently, IMO has postponed the adoption of the
mandatory Polar Code from 2012 to 2014, potentially entering into force in 2017 at
the earliest (Lloyd’s List 2014).
Drafting negotiations revolve around new standards on construction, design,
equipment, and manning (CDEM), as well as other operational concerns as the
management of ballast water to curtail invasive species, and measures to prevent
hull eco-fouling. Especially salient are disagreements on ice-strengthening standards
for ships and the inclusion of an environmental chapter that could exclude the use
of heavy fuel oil similar to current regulations in Antarctica (IMO 2011a). A
question also lingers on the potential regulatory overlap between the Polar Code
and the extended jurisdiction conferred to Arctic states in UNCLOS Article 234.
Finally, a fourth major element of governance involves Russia. While Russian
extended jurisdiction remains contested by the U.S., Russia has produced the
majority of enforced Arctic-specific regulations for commercial shipping. Under-
standably, Russia, having the vast majority of the coastline along the NEP, holds
the biggest stake in it. The Russian Arctic Strategy highlights the Russian Arctic as
the key future resource reservoir and points to the necessity of infrastructural and
administrative development of the NSR. Russia sees the utilization of the NSR as a
national integrated transport and communication system, being instrumental in
safeguarding vital interests of the country in its Arctic sphere (Russian Federa-
tion 2008).
Prior to the end of the USSR, the NSR had a considerable amount of traffic, but
mostly for servicing domestic locations. With the collapse of the USSR came the
political opening of the NEP by Russia legislating international ship traffic in 1990
(Solski 2013). Russia has now refurbished the law with a new set of rules enacted in
2012 and 2013 (Federal Law on the NSR, July 28, 2012; Rules of navigation on the
Water Area of the NSR, the order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, January
17, 2013).
Russia has set up a new NSR administration allowing for centralization of
responsibilities; it has simplified the rules for a more streamlined application
process and amended some of its most contentious elements to bring the legislation
into compliance with international law. Going forward, prior inspection in a
Russian port is no longer a requirement, icebreaker assistance is not always
mandatory, and assessment of fees based on paying potential (which was contested
under UNCLOS Article 26) is scrapped. The payment is now to correspond with
the scope of service rendered. These services are limited to icebreaker assistance and
the hiring of a specialized Arctic pilot. To determine the need for either of those
services, new 2013 rules take into consideration vessel’s ice-capability, area and
period of navigation, and current ice conditions (Ministry of Transport 2013b). In
2014, more specific mechanisms for icebreaker tariff calculation were also adopted,
taking one more step toward fee transparency (FTSR 2014).
Even if increasing shipping along the NSR has already had an impact on the local
economic activities and traditional nature management (Davydov and Mikhailova
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2011), overall, governance in the Arctic is becoming highly developed, balancing
environmental protection and the security of indigenous peoples and local
communities with support for economic growth and shipping. It will also be
important to understand how shipping and port development will affect urban
development, demography, transport routes, and the environment. UNCLOS sets
the tone of protecting freedom of navigation by any country, while also conferring
economic rights, sovereignty limits, and environmental stewardship responsibilities
to the coastal states. These principles are taken further and developed by the AC,
IMO, and Russia’s domestic legislation. The result is a system open to international
shipping within a framework of significant safety and environmental regulations,
supported both by the Arctic states and by multilateral institutions such as the AC
and IMO.
Jurisdictional disputes
Despite the potential for a constructive shared governance, a political challenge to
Arctic shipping stems from potential jurisdictional disputes over large areas of
Arctic waters. Russia (and Canada along the NWP) has challenged the traditional
notion of freedom of navigation as applied to the NEP by granting itself
jurisdiction to apply domestic legislation, prompting opposition from the U.S.
and other countries. While Russia has recently begun changing course toward a
more orthodox application of international norms in the Arctic, questions remain
as to how far Russia will take its reforms.
Both Russia and supporters of traditional freedom of navigation heavily rely on
UNCLOS to justify their positions. Following what was already customary law,
UNCLOS codified in Article 87 the freedom of navigation in the high seas. It
further guaranteed the right of ‘innocent passage through the territorial sea’
(Article 17; which extends 12 nm off the coast) and also the ‘right of archipelagic
sea lanes passage’ (Article 52). It recognized the ‘right of transit passage’ through
‘straits which are used for international navigation’ and freedom of transit through
exclusive economic zones (EEZ; Articles 37, 38, 58). Only internal waters (Article 8)
were excluded from the international principle of freedom of navigation and, in
particular, from the right of innocent passage, remaining instead under the
unrestricted sovereignty of the state.
Under the terms of UNCLOS, Russia has invoked Article 234 to regulate the
passage of ships sailing in ice-covered waters beyond its territorial seas. This article
is central to determining the extent of rights of Arctic coastal states, conferring
extended powers to regulate shipping for the purpose of environmental protection
in areas where ice poses a shipping hazard. For that purpose, it grants coastal states
regulatory powers over ‘ice-covered’ waters beyond their territorial waters and
within their EEZ. However, no international political consensus exists on the
definition of ‘ice-covered,’ as nominally ice-free waters may contain ice in low
concentrations. Article 234 also introduces ambiguity in its ending clause: ‘with due
regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment.’ While possibly meant to strike a balance between the power of a coastal
state to protect the environment and the rights of other states to freedom of
navigation, the language is broad and open to multiple interpretations. Currently,
the few ships traveling through the NEP are following Russia’s terms. However, the
U.S. contests the Russian interpretation, reasoning that Russia may use Article 234
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as a pretext to impinge upon freedom of navigation (Flake 2013, Østreng et al.
2013, pp. 13–18, Ragner 2000, pp. 80–83).
While the true motives of the Russian Government remain somewhat unclear,
scholars have speculated that Russia has intentionally maintained a degree of
strategic ambiguity, allowing for the coexistence of divergent scholarly arguments
that altogether support its claim of extended authority in Arctic waters, without
being clear enough as to elicit stronger protests by other countries (Solski 2013).
The application of this jurisdiction has led to the imposition of a system of
expansive control involving mandatory navigation permits and transit fees. While
the latter is allowed in some limited circumstances (Article 26), the first is very
unusual. To support its policy, Russia interpreted the definition of internal waters
(Articles 7 and 8) in such way as to controversially enclose major groups of islands
with a system of baselines defining waters in straits as internal waters (Østreng et al.
2013, pp. 13–18, Ragner 2000, pp. 80–83). Russia had also enacted a doctrine by
which it would claim authority over ships temporarily leaving the NSR to venture
into the high seas, in addition to claiming state governance over the NSR on the
grounds that it was historically a domestic transport route (Ragner 2000,
Solski 2013).
Russia’s disputed jurisdictional claims are cause for concern for two reasons.
First, because even if the few ships sailing today through the NSR are granted
permission to navigate, Russia has set a framework that obligates all ships to
request permission to access the NSR. In the future Russia could choose to exercise
its self-granted authority to deny passage for political reasons. In 2013, Russia
denied three times the requests made by Greenpeace’s icebreaker Arctic Sunrise to
enter the NSR. While Russia cited technical deficiencies in the ship, making it unfit
for Arctic waters, it is likely the decision was politically motivated (Ritter 2013).
Another reason for concern is that ongoing, intensified disputes could lead to an
uncertain climate for investment in infrastructure (Simmons 2005) needed to
support growth in shipping (AMSA 2009). Furthermore, continued sea ice
reductions could introduce further uncertainty over which areas remain ‘ice-
covered’ under Article 234.
Despite these disagreements, there are signs that Russia is moving toward a more
international interpretation of maritime jurisdiction. In 2012, Russia began
enacting a series of legislative reforms to modernize their management and
regulation of the NSR. Notably, Russia no longer claims extended jurisdiction by
virtue of a ship leaving the NSR in its law of 2012 (Russian Federation 2012). In
addition, the permit application has been streamlined and calls for compliance with
international law (Solski 2013). The rules and tariffs of 2013 and 2014 are some
more small steps in implementing a streamlined, fair, and transparent process.
However, while these reforms appear to set a new course in Russian policy that is
more welcoming to international shipping in the Arctic, the terms of the reforms
need to be developed in more detailed subsequent legislations and implementations
(Solski 2013). Most important, it is necessary to better define the boundaries of the
NSR upon which Russia claims jurisdiction and the extent to which Russia will
exercise its authority. Since Russia has a track record of dissonance between
legislation and its implementation, there remains uncertainty over how the reforms
will be carried out in practice. In addition, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 has affected
the relations between Russia and the West, raising further uncertainty about the
potential for future Arctic cooperation. Whether Russia will deliver on its stated
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reforms will depend in part on the resolution of political debates between domestic
nationalist and ‘progressive’ factions (Solski 2013), as well as the evolving
geopolitical landscape.
Changing Arctic sea ice
The disputes over how to apply freedom of navigation in the Arctic, what new
treaties to negotiate, what new regulations to enact, and what relevance emerging
regional governance bodies depend in large part on the expectations and actual
evolution of ice conditions in the Arctic. While predicting long-term ice conditions
is difficult owing to numerous spatial and temporal uncertainties (Stephenson et al.
2013a, 2013b, Stroeve et al. 2012), examining recent trends may offer a glimpse of
what could be expected in the future.
Ice extent and thickness are critically important for navigation. Extent, or the
area covered by at least 15% ice, grows and shrinks seasonally revealing open water
in summer throughout much of the eastern Arctic.3 Ice thickness and age are closely
related, as multiyear ice (having survived one or more summers) is generally thicker
and harder than first-year ice and poses a significant danger to ships. Overall,
extent, thickness, and age of ice have experienced reductions in the past decades,
with accelerated loss beginning around the year 2000.
The 1979–2000 average summer minimum ice extent was 6.71 million km2
(Perovich et al. 2012). In contrast, the September 2007 ice extent declined to low-
record levels of 4.17 million km2, and in September 2012 to 3.41 million km2. In
September 2013, the minimum yearly extent was recorded at 5.10 million km2
(NSIDC 2013). The seven lowest recorded minimum extents since satellite
observations began in 1979 have occurred in the last 7 years. The largest reduction
between the March maximum and September minimum extents occurred in 2012.
The winter average extent from 1981 to 2010 was 15.51 million km2, with a record
low in 2011 of 14.63 million km2. March 2014 had the fifth lowest maximum winter
extent on record (NSIDC 2014a, 2014b).
Submarine sonar measurements of ice thickness for portions of the Arctic Ocean
began in 1958. These data indicate that overall mean winter thickness declined from
3.64 m in 1980 to 1.89 m in 2008. Prior to 1997, summer ice extent was 90% of the
winter maximum, but by 2007, this percentage had declined to 55% (Kwok and
Rothrock 2009). Satellite data from 1980 to 2011 indicate a steep reduction of
multiyear ice with a record low in 2008. The fraction of total multiyear ice in March
decreased from about 75% in the mid-1980s to 45% in 2011, while the proportion
of the oldest ice declined from 50% of the multiyear ice pack to 10%. Since 2008,
multiyear ice levels have recovered somewhat (Comiso 2012, Maslanik et al. 2011).
Research points to both natural and human feedback mechanisms that may
contribute to greater ice reductions. The loss of summer sea ice exposes more ocean
water to incoming shortwave solar radiation. The absorption of shortwave solar
radiation by an increasingly ice-free ocean leads to increased heating of surface
waters, which reinforces the summer melting of sea ice (Deser et al. 2000), and
increases heat and moisture flux from the Arctic Ocean to the atmosphere during
autumn and winter (Overland and Wang 2010). In the same way, particulate
emissions lower the albedo of ice, enhancing melting further. While receding ice
enables Arctic shipping, shipping itself may also contribute to sea ice retreat
through greenhouse gas and particulate emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on
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Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the current net climate impact of shipping is
negative (IPCC 2013, Solomon et al. 2007), and diverting traffic from lower
latitudes to the NEP may reduce global shipping emissions by up to 20% (Winther
et al. 2014). However, short-lived climate warming agents from exhaust such as soot
have an enhanced effect at high latitudes (Berntsen et al. 2006, Curry et al. 1996,
Garrett and Zhao 2006). Also, unlike stationary activities, moving ships create a
diffuse source spreading the emissions over a larger area. This leads to a stronger
climate effect per emission unit of black carbon deposited on ice (Berntsen et al.
2006, Hadley and Kirchstetter 2012). Nevertheless, emissions from shipping are
likely to be minor in comparison to those from the petroleum extraction industry
(Ødemark et al. 2012).
While predictions vary, recent historical data reveal a marked downward trend in
ice extent, hinting at the possibility of continued decline throughout the century.
Younger and thinner ice is already enabling more frequent voyages by icebreaking
vessels and by common cargo vessels along ice-free coastal areas during summer.
Local emissions from shipping and onshore activities may create a positive
feedback loop, reducing ice further. While it may take decades, a progressive
reduction of this physical barrier would be an enticing prospect for commercial
shipping along the NEP. However, free-floating ice in summer will remain a serious
threat to navigation, and widespread ice in winter will continue to obstruct passage
by most ships.
Technology and infrastructure
Even as the ice-covered area shrinks, harsh weather conditions, low visibility due to
darkness in winter, and intermittent fog in all seasons remain important technical
obstacles to navigation in the Arctic. This is especially salient as remoteness places
further demands on a ship’s independence and its ability to operate in these
conditions. Robust technical standards are determined and enforced by both public
and private entities. These factors also heighten the need for land-based supporting
infrastructure like SAR and repair facilities.
Innovation in Arctic shipping technology began over 100 years ago and has
developed considerably since the 1960s. For example, the azimuth thruster is a
major innovation in ship propulsion and maneuverability, which allows for
rudderless movement in any horizontal direction. The azimuth thruster is typically
included in double acting ships, which are vessels that sail forward in open waters,
but turn around and proceed astern (backward) in heavy ice conditions. These
advancements increase both the safety and the operational capabilities of Arctic
shipping (Wilkman and Mattsson 2014).
The adoption of these types of technologies is driven by the standards set by the
IMO, which in turn are further detailed and verified in ships by classification
societies. The IMO sets minimum standards for ships that may be adopted by
member states as mandatory through domestic legislation (IMO 2011b). In
addition, individual states may impose more demanding regulations on their own.
Noncompliant ships may be detained in a member state port, or denied entry. As
mentioned above, the IMO is in a process of developing a mandatory Polar Code,
which for now is only advisory.
In addition to international standards, classification societies have developed
their own set of rules for the design and construction of vessels. The main purpose
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of these rules is to ensure the structural strength and integrity of the ship’s hull as
well as the reliability and operability of all systems on board required for
maintaining the ship’s essential services, such as the propulsion, steering, and
power generation systems (IACS 2011a). Many classification societies have also
developed specific rules for vessels intended for operations in ice-covered waters.
These rules are often based on the Finnish-Swedish ice class rules (Trafi 2010) and
the Unified Requirements concerning Polar Class (IACS 2011b) published by the
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS). While the exact rules
may differ between classification societies, it is common for all ships with Ice or
Polar Class that they have to fulfill additional requirements, including ice
strengthening of the hull, a higher propulsion power, and other winterizing features.
Given the frigid weather conditions, ships operating in the Arctic require
winterization, a process of adapting safety, navigation and cargo handling
equipment for cold climate to ensure operability. Winterization addresses chal-
lenges unique to sub-zero environments, including icing, the accumulation of ice on
the structure of a ship from sea spray, snow, rain and fog. Icing creates hazards for
sailors, impairs equipment, and makes ships top-heavy, undermining vessel stability
(Guest and Luke 2005). Winterization solutions include building structures and
equipment from materials resistant to low temperatures, to avoid breakage, or
inoperability when frozen (e.g. pipes and plastic hoses). Winterization also involves
anti-freezing measures, such as constant heating of pipes, valves, instruments,
antennae, doors, and stairways, pathways that need to be kept unfrozen and
operable at all times, and attendant increases in power-generating capacity. It also
requires the procurement of freezing-resistant supplies, like lubricants and fire-
fighting equipment that remains immune to low temperatures. Other winterization
needs include preventing the freezing of ballast tanks, deicing capabilities like
having hoses for steam blowing and having advanced life support lifeboats that
provide sheltering and heating systems (DNV 2013).
Ships also rely on third-party support services, which include repairs and
maintenance, traffic control, communications, SAR, and weather forecasts,
particularly for predicting the hazardous polar lows (atmospheric depressions).
Most Russian ports are in disrepair, neglected since Soviet times. While modern
large vessels have enough autonomy to traverse the NEP without refueling, in case
of damage the current availability of ports for repairs and maintenance is scarce,
which in turn increases insurance premiums. According to the register of the
seaports of the Russian Federation, there are 18 marine ports in the Russian Arctic,
divided into three groups. Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Vitino and Kandalaksha are in
fairly good condition with rail connections. The ports of Varandey and Dudinka
are active but serve a single company, exporting oil and nickel for Lukoil and
Norilsk Nickel, respectively. Finally, 11 ports are located in regions with sparse
land transportation infrastructure.4 These ports are in poor condition and are used
mainly for local resupply for nearby cities and settlements (5–50% of their
capacities are currently utilized; FSUE 2013, Ministry of Transport 2013a). In
addition, a new Arctic port in Sabetta is currently under construction, with the first
phase scheduled to conclude in 2014 and the second in 2016. It is expected to
become a major harbor in the Russian Arctic and to boost Arctic shipping. Sabetta
is part of the Yamal LNG project (joint venture of Novatek, Total, and China
National Petroleum Corporation) and is cofunded by the Russian Government
(Ship-Technology 2013, Staalesen 2012).
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Voice and data transfer capability is necessary for transmission of weather
forecasts, ice charts, and distress signals between ships and for the emergency
response services to coordinate operations. The available communication systems
along the NSR are the Iridium satellites providing telephone and low-speed
Internet. Radio transmissions along the Very High Frequency (VHF), High
Frequency (HF) and Medium Frequency (MF) bands are also available. These
services are adequate for voice communication. However, digital and broadband
applications like the reception of modern weather and ice forecasts, global
positioning system- (GPS) augmentation signals, or upcoming e-Navigation
applications (Bronk 2013) are not reliably available. While a Vessel Traffic
Management and Information System (VTMIS) has been in place along the NSR
for decades, its capacity is inadequate for current shipping demand. These systems
gather, evaluate, and distribute information about waterborne traffic to improve
safety and efficiency. VTMIS capacity is scheduled to be upgraded by 2020, but it is
unclear whether funding is available (Østreng et al. 2013, p. 200).
Broadband at sea requires line of sight access to a geostationary satellite for the
main data intensive technologies to work. Due to the curvature of the earth,
geostationary satellites cannot be used above 70–75 degrees of latitude. While these
satellites transmit data at speeds of 2–4 Mbit/second, the Iridium Polar orbiting
satellite array provides Kbits of speed, analogous to the Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) cellular Internet coverage on land. These satellites orbit
the globe at lower altitudes, and many satellites are required to be operating
simultaneously to ensure coverage of the Arctic region. To offset this cost,
connection speeds are much slower than satellites in geostationary orbits. To
provide better service, the Norwegian companies Telenor and Kongsberg are
working on launching new satellites that would provide better Arctic coverage in a
project called Arctic Satellite Communication (ASK). This project is currently
under study (Benjaminsen 2013, INTSOK 2012, Norwegian Space Center ca 2013).
The challenges with stable and high bandwidth data-communication in high
latitudes also cause satellite positioning systems (e.g. GPS) to have insufficient
accuracy for some offshore marine operations. During loading, construction, or
maintenance operations, ships operate in very close vicinity to facilities which
require dynamic positioning with decimeter accuracy. This accuracy can be
provided by ‘augmenting’ the standard GPS signal (accuracy ∼3 to 5 m; USDOD
2007) with a reference signal from a shore-based station (differential GPS, or
DGPS). At lower latitudes, this signal is provided to vessels through a geostation-
ary satellite service. Iridium is currently being considered as an alternative to
provide the DGPS augmentation signal in the Arctic (de Jong et al. 2014).
Responses to maritime accidents include SAR and oil spill containment and
recovery. In line with the aforementioned AC’s agreement on SAR of 2011,
responsibility for coordination of these activities along the NSR is governed by
Russia. However, this agreement does not allocate any responsibility for the specific
physical implementation of responses. The Russian plans involve extensive
development of shore-based infrastructure (depots, crewing, and resupply logistics).
Russian authorities are expecting cargo transported through the NSR to grow
significantly (Pettersen 2014) and have invested 910M rubles ($30.1M) into the
creation of 10 SAR centers along the NSR (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Naryan-Mar,
Vorkuta, Nadym, Tiksi, Pevek, Provideniya, and Anadyr) to be completed by 2015
(Pettersen 2011). While these investments are a positive step toward infrastructural
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development in the Arctic, many experts believe that much more investments will be
necessary (AMSA 2009).
Substantial parts of the NSR lie outside the coverage of these bases, making
Russian icebreakers the only potential respondents to a SAR request (NSR
Information Office 2013, USCG 2013). Even though an icebreaker convoy is no
longer obligatory for certain classes of vessels under certain conditions (Ministry of
Transport 2013b), ships will still be dependent on one of these icebreakers to be in
range for adequate response assurance. The availability of these icebreakers may
dwindle by the future development of the Yamal LNG project, as well as increased
demand along extended parts of the NSR. Russia owns the largest icebreaking fleet
in the world, including the largest nuclear-powered icebreakers. Five icebreakers are
currently operational. One icebreaker is currently undergoing construction, and
three more are planned to become operational this decade. However, at least three
of these icebreakers will likely replace aging icebreakers built during the Soviet era
(USCG 2013).
Under the implementation of the Russian federal target program Development of
transport system of Russia (2010–2015), the construction of six modern response
vessels is planned (NSR Information Office 2013). Until these vessels and a potential
increase of shore-based resources are in place, the availability of response infrastruc-
ture along theNSR is lower than along other shipping areas in the world and will most
likely be unable to handle all potential response scenarios (AMSA 2009).
To cope with the hazards of free-floating ice, a nascent field of ice forecasting is
quickly developing. Monitoring of sea ice conditions is critical for understanding
both climate changes and navigation. The scientific community has used many
instruments and algorithms for sea ice analysis. Remotely sensed sea ice data are
available from several instruments operating in the visible, infrared, and microwave
bands. The most suitable instrument for sea ice monitoring for operational
purposes is Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)5 because it performs independent of
weather conditions and has a high spatial resolution (1–100 m; Johannessen et al.
2007). It is widely used for tactical planning of optimal sailing routes for icebreakers
and other vessels. Sea ice charts from national ice services in Europe and in North
America are mainly based on passive microwave and SAR data. Passive microwave
data have played a primary role in monitoring long-term inter-annual sea ice
climatology since 1972 when the electrically scanning microwave radiometer aboard
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’ s Nimbus-5 satellite
was launched.
Sea ice retrieval algorithms using satellite data provide information on sea ice
edge, type, concentration, and drift, as well as other dynamic characteristics such as
zones of convergence and divergence that are critical for shipping (Karvonen et al.
2003, Martin and Augstein 2000, Zakhvatkina et al. 2013). Algorithm development
is ongoing, and new SAR missions will be launched in the near future. Sea ice
thickness remains difficult to retrieve using satellite data. New satellite altimeters
provide improved sea ice freeboard for retrieval of ice thickness (ICESat and
CryoSat-2). The methods of sea ice thickness retrieval are improving and results
appear promising (Alexandrov et al. 2010, Sandven et al. 2011).
The harsh conditions of the Arctic require additional investment in materials and
technology to develop stronger and highly equipped ships. Currently, the lack of
widespread advanced communications and navigation technology poses significant
operational risks. Land-based infrastructure in aging Russian seaports is mostly
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lacking as well, and minimal SAR capabilities exist currently along the NSR.
Looking forward, new promising technologies like ice forecasting continue their
development. These combined with possible but uncertain investment in satellites
and coastal supporting services may serve to mitigate some environmental hazards.
However, the high costs of such technologies and their relative developmental
infancy suggest that it will be some time before their implementation will favor
mainstream commercial shipping through the Arctic.
Conclusions
The NEP now bears more favorable ice conditions and a more stable and inclusive
governance framework than ever before in its history. These changes are happening
at a time of growing international trade driven by the rise of Asian economies,
which require increasing imports of energy and raw materials. However, these
conditions will only enable the NEP to become a seasonal complement, rather than
replacement, to the Suez Canal (Reuters 2013).
Two major developments have facilitated growth in Arctic shipping in recent
years. The first is the widespread climate-driven loss of sea ice, unprecedented in the
35 years of observed record. Projected future reductions have the potential to make
the Arctic dramatically more navigable. More investments in infrastructure,
navigation, communications, and the nascent field of ice forecasting offer potential
for long-term growth in Arctic shipping. The second is the political opening of
Arctic waters to international shipping within a stable institutional framework. This
is a direct product of policy choices, with the AC continuously developing and
adapting policies to the Arctic, and Russia reforming and streamlining its NSR
regime, while also starting to invest in infrastructure. However, the possibility for
future jurisdictional disagreements owing to differences of interpretations of
international law could discourage development of international shipping.
The advantage of connecting Atlantic with Pacific with a 24% distance reduction
(for Shanghai–Rotterdam) is offset by many factors including harsher weather and
free-floating sea ice, requiring more expensive ship construction, and winterization
investments. Remoteness, lack of broadband communications, and limited SAR
capabilities increase the risk of Arctic operations. Shallow waters limit vessel size,
and ice movements lead to unpredictability of the ships’ arrival time. Lack of a
dense coastal population lessens the value of the NEP as a trading route. For these
reasons, the NEP is a less reliable seasonal alternative to the Suez Canal, especially
for container transport. On the other hand, as a source of minerals and energy, the
Eurasian Arctic holds greater short-term potential, evidenced by extensive mining
in the region today. Emerging as well as mature markets in Asia are likely to drive
Arctic resource development, leading to a growth of destinational shipping traffic
along the NEP.
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Notes
1. Note that these statistics can become inflated when equating trans-Arctic voyages to
voyages traversing the entirety of NSR, but not the entirety of the NEP. In that case, trips
connecting Murmansk and Arkhangelsk (which lie outside the NSR but still within the
Arctic) with a non-Arctic port become trans-Arctic voyages, increasing total transit
shipping to 39 voyages.
2. The discrepancy between USGS and the Russian Academy of Science stems in part from
the use of different definitions of the area extent of the Arctic. Furthermore, even though
the data is several years old, they are the latest comprehensive studies available to date.
New upcoming drilling in the summer of 2014 by Rosneft and ExxonMobil in the Kara
Sea may yield new data (Efimov et al. 2014).
3. A good illustration of the recent year cycle of ice expansion and shrinkage can be found in
a time-lapse video published by the NSR Information Office, which shows the relationship
between ‘Sea ice concentration and ship traffic during a yearly cycle’ (2011; http://www.
arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits).
4. These ports are, from East to West: Beringovsky, Anadyr, Egvekinot, Provideniya, Pevek,
Tiksi, Khatanga, Dikson, Naryan-Mar, Mezen, and Onega.
5. The SAR acronym for Synthetic Aperture Radar is not to be confused with the same
acronym for Search and Rescue and needs to be interpreted within the context where it is
written.
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